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USING INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
ADVISORY OPINIONS TO ADJUDICATE
SECESSIONIST CLAIMS
David Sloss*
I. INTRODUCTION
Hardly a week passes without news of deaths attribut-
able to a violent conflict between a group demanding "auton-
omy" or "independence" and a national government resisting
those demands. For example, in a single week in March
2001, "[t]hree bombs in southern Russia, blamed on Chechen
rebels, killed a score of civilians," and there were "three Pal-
estinian bomb explosions in Israel, one of which killed two
teenagers." The previous week, the "ETA, the Basque sepa-
ratist terror group, killed the deputy mayor of a small town in
the Basque region a week after setting off two car-bombs in
Mediterranean resorts."' Clearly, the international commu-
nity has a substantial interest in promoting peaceful resolu-
tion of secessionist disputes.
The International Court of Justice ("I.C.J.") advisory
opinion procedure is a potentially useful mechanism, hereto-
fore under-utilized, for the settlement of disputes between
recognized states and secessionist groups within those states.'
This is not to say that all or even most secessionist disputes
can be solved by I.C.J. adjudication. Rather, there are two
distinct benefits to be gained from international adjudication
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law. J.D.,
Stanford Law School; M.P.P., Harvard University; B.A., Hampshire College.
This paper was initially presented at a conference at Santa Clara Law School.
1. Politics This Week, THE ECONOMIST, March 31, 2001, at 4.
2. Politics This Week, THE ECONOMIST, March 24, 2001, at 6.
3. The I.C.J. advisory opinion procedure was established by Article 65 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 65, 59 Stat. 1055, 1063, available at
http'/www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm
[hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].
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of secessionist claims. First, case-by-case adjudication of se-
cessionist claims is likely to be a better mechanism than
adoption of United Nations ("U.N.") Declarations or conven-
tions4 for clarifying the international legal rules governing the
relationship between the right of peoples to self-
determination and the right of states to preserve their terri-
torial integrity.' Second, international adjudication may, in
some cases, facilitate political resolution of secessionist dis-
putes.
At the outset, it is important to comment briefly on ter-
minology. This article refers in some places to a right of self-
determination, and elsewhere to a right of secession. The two
are not synonymous. International law clearly establishes
that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination." In
contrast, there is no international treaty or declaration that
clearly establishes a right of secession.7 Nevertheless, there
are persuasive arguments, firmly rooted in international law,
for recognizing a remedial right of secession in certain cases
involving flagrant violations of peoples' self-determination
rights.8 Hence, this article uses the phrase "right of seces-
sion" to denote a remedial right, bearing in mind that peoples'
self-determination rights can be achieved, in most cases, by
means other than secession.9
Part II of this essay discusses the potential benefits to be
gained by adjudication of secessionist claims. Part III briefly
surveys a range of possible procedural mechanisms for inter-
national adjudication of secessionist claims. Part IV exam-
ines in detail the procedural obstacles to using the I.C.J.'s
4. For discussion of relevant U.N. Declarations, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 11-15.
5. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity of any state).
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, art. 1, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1,
para. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCRI. See also infra notes 8, 11-18 and
accompanying text.
7. See Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,
42 (1993) ("Secession is not presently recognized as a right under international
law, nor does international law prohibit secession.").
8. See infra notes 19-20, 136-37 and accompanying text.
9. For an insightful analysis of various types of autonomy arrangements
that help promote self-determination without secession, see HURST HANNUM,
AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION
OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 333-448 (1996).
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contentious jurisdiction"° as a mechanism for international
adjudication of secessionist claims. In light of the procedural
obstacles, the use of the I.C.J.'s contentious jurisdiction will
rarely, if ever, be a viable option. Part V advocates use of the
I.C.J.'s advisory jurisdiction as a mechanism for adjudicating
some (but not all) secessionist claims and uses the Tibetan
example as a case study to illustrate the potential difficulties
and benefits of utilizing I.C.J. advisory opinions to adjudicate
secessionist claims.
II. WHY ADJUDICATION?
International adjudication of secessionist claims can pro-
vide two important benefits. First, adjudication may help to
clarify the scope of an international legal right of secession.
Second, adjudication may help to facilitate political resolution
of some secessionist disputes.
A. Adjudication as a Tool for Clarifying the Scope of a Right
of Secession
Virtually every author who has written about the topic
agrees that there is a need to clarify the international legal
rules governing the right of a sub-national group to secede
from a recognized state." Yet international attempts to clar-
ify those rules have been notoriously unsuccessful.
For example, the U.N. Charter establishes that one of the
main purposes of the organization is to "develop friendly rela-
tions among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples."" The Charter
also affirms the right of states to preserve their territorial in-
10. The term "contentious jurisdiction" refers to the I.C.J.'s jurisdiction to
adjudicate disputes between states. In contrast, the term "advisory jurisdiction"
refers to the I.C.J.'s jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion in response to a
request from a U.N. body.
11. The literature on secession and self-determination is vast. Key books on
the topic include: ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL
DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC (1991); LEE C.
BUCHHEIT, SECESSION (1978); ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF
PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1995). Key articles include: Lea Brilmayer,
Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L
L. 177 (1991); Hannum, supra note 7; Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sov-
ereignty: Self-Determination in the Postcolonial Age, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255
(1996).
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
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tegrity."3 The Charter says nothing, though, about the cir-
cumstances in which a state's right to territorial integrity
must yield to a group's right to self-determination, or vice-
versa.
Twenty-five years after adoption of the Charter, the
United Nations attempted to clarify the relationship between
groups' rights to self-determination and states' rights to pre-
serve their territorial integrity. The Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations ("1970 Declaration") affirms that "all peo-
ples have the right freely to determine, without external in-
terference, their political status and to pursue their economic,
social and cultural development." 4 However, the 1970 Decla-
ration adds:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dis-
member or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integ-
rity or political unity of sovereign and independent states
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described
above and thus possessed of a government representing
the whole people belonging to the territory without dis-
tinction as to race, creed or colour. 5
The 1970 Declaration makes clear that no group has a
right to secede from a state that conducts itself in accordance
with "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples." 6 However, the 1970 Declaration left two important
questions unresolved. First, it is unclear whether a group has
an international legal right to secede from a state whose con-
duct violates the principle of equal rights and self-
determination. Second, assuming that such a remedial right
exists, it is unclear which violations of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination give rise to a remedial right of
secession.
Recent U.N. Declarations have not clarified these ambi-
guities. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993,
13. See id. art. 2, para. 4.
14. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971) (adopted on Oct. 24, 1970).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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essentially repeats the formula from the 1970 Declaration.
17
So, too, does the 1995 Declaration on the Occasion of the Fif-
tieth Anniversary of the United Nations.18
There are at least three reasons to be skeptical about the
prospects for utilizing U.N. Declarations to help clarify the
legal rules governing the right of a sub-national group to se-
cede from a recognized state. First, when one considers the
variety of factual situations in which groups assert a right of
independence, it is apparent that each situation is character-
ized by unique historical, geographical, political and other
factors. In light of the wide variety of factual situations that
must be considered in attempting to craft generally applicable
legal principles, it is not surprising that the legal principles
that have been proposed are rather vague. Indeed, even good
faith attempts by scholars who have no political agenda other
than to clarify the applicable legal rules tend to yield general
principles that are so malleable that it is difficult to predict
how they will apply in any particular factual situation.
9
Second, U.N. Declarations are an imperfect tool for clari-
fying the law because such declarations are the product of a
negotiation process that necessarily involves compromise
among states with competing interests. Insofar as states dis-
agree about how best to reconcile the competing norms of self-
determination and territorial integrity, use of ambiguous lan-
guage helps to facilitate agreement on a final document that
17. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993). Paragraph 2 of Part I affirms
that "[aill peoples have the right of self-determination." Id. at pt.1, para. 2.
However, the same paragraph states that this right
shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territo-
rial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus pos-
sessed of a Government representing the whole people belonging
to the territory without distinction of any kind.
Id.
18. Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Na-
tions, G.A. Res. 6, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 13, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/50/49 (1995). Paragraph I repeats essentially the same language quoted
in the preceding footnote.
19. See, e.g., Bryan Schwartz & Susan Waywood, A Model Declaration on
the Right of Secession, 11 N.Y. INT'L L. REV., Summer 1998, at 2, 10-12 (1998)
(recommending a multi-factor balancing approach with fourteen factors that
must be taken into account in assessing any given situation).
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allows all competing factions to declare victory. ° Indeed, this
appears to offer at least a partial explanation for the tortured
language quoted above from the 1970 Declaration.2' In sum,
the process of compromise undermines the utility of U.N.
Declarations as a tool for clarification of legal principles.
Third, attempts to utilize U.N. Declarations to help clar-
ify the relevant legal rules are also hampered by the fact that
many of the states involved in drafting the declarations have
political interests that conflict with the goal of clarifying the
legal rules. A clear, unambiguous legal rule prohibiting se-
cession in all circumstances would be unacceptable to states
that have an interest in promoting, or in being perceived as
promoting, the goal of self-determination, because a flat pro-
hibition would be inconsistent with that interest. In contrast,
a clear, unambiguous legal rule prescribing secession as a
remedy for specified violations of self-determination rights
would be equally unacceptable to many states, because they
have a political interest in not tying their hands by deter-
mining in advance the consequence of prohibited conduct. In
short, many states do not want to clarify the legal rules re-
lated to secession, because any clarification of the rules limits
their flexibility.22
Of the three factors cited above that make it difficult toproduce unambiguous U.N. Declarations-divergent factual
situations, the value of ambiguity in building consensus, and
conflicting political interests-only the first applies with
equal force to adjudicatory bodies. International judges, un-
like diplomats, are not motivated primarily by a desire to ad-
vance their countries' political interests.28 Granted, any judi-
20. As a junior government officer involved in multilateral negotiations, Ilearned that my efforts to clarify ambiguous language, which I thought wouldhelp produce a "better" document, were viewed with suspicion by my senior col-leagues, who wanted to retain the ambiguous language precisely because it
helped facilitate agreement.
21. See CASSESE, supra note 11, at 115-18 (discussing the negotiating his-
tory of the 1970 Declaration).
22. The statement that states are reluctant to clarify rules in ways that un-
necessarily limit their flexibility can be seen as a corollary of Professor Henkin'sfamous maxim that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of interna-tional law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time." LouIsHENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLIcY 47 (2d ed. 1979).Since states generally have an interest in observing international legal obliga-tions, they are reluctant to endorse international legal rules with which they
may not wish to comply.
23. I concede that no judges are entirely apolitical, and that some judges
362 [Vol. 42
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cial body composed of more than one judge, like political bod-
ies, faces pressure to compromise for the sake of arriving at a
majority opinion. But judges are far less prone than diplo-
mats to use ambiguity as a consensus-building tool. Thus,
the main obstacle to utilizing case-by-case adjudication to
clarify the legal relationship between peoples' self-
determination rights and states' territorial integrity rights is
that general legal principles must necessarily be somewhat
vague if they are to be applied to a wide variety of different
factual circumstances.
Aside from the above considerations, one additional fac-
tor gives international adjudication a distinct advantage over
U.N. Declarations as a tool for clarifying the law: judges must
apply general legal principles to a specific set of facts. By ap-
plying law to fact, judges can help clarify the law. The Cana-
dian Supreme Court's recent decision in Reference Re: Seces-
sion of Quebec24 illustrates the comparative advantage of
adjudication as a tool for clarifying the scope of the interna-
tional legal right of secession.
In the Quebec case, the Canadian Supreme Court was
asked to decide the following question:
Does international law give the National Assembly, legis-
lature or government of Quebec the right to effect the se-
cession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In this re-
gard, is there a right to self-determination under
international law that would give the National Assembly,
legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?
25
In a very thoughtful and scholarly opinion, the Court
analyzed various sources of international law. 6 Based on
that analysis, the Court identified three types of circum-
stances in which a group could make a plausible claim for an
international legal right of secession: (1) situations involving
former colonies; (2) cases involving foreign military occupa-
tion; and (3) situations where "a people is blocked from the
meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination inter-
may be very political. Even so, we expect international judges to decide cases in
accordance with law, not politics, and most judges act in accordance with that
expectation in most cases.
24. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [19981 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
25. Id. at 218.
26. See id. at 277-88.
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nally."27 The Court then analyzed the Quebec situation and
concluded that Quebec did not have an international legal
right to secede from Canada because the facts of the Quebec
case did not fit within any of these three categories." Since
the Judges on the Canadian Supreme Court acted in their in-
dividual capacity, not as political representatives, and since
they were not compelled to adopt ambiguous phraseology in
the interest of promoting consensus, the Court was able to ar-
ticulate a clear statement of the general principles governing
the international legal right of secession, far clearer than any
statement contained in any U.N. Declaration. Moreover, the
Court did not merely articulate general principles, but it ap-
plied those principles to a specific set of facts. The process of
applying law to fact helped the court to clarify the general le-
gal principles.
In sum, there are compelling reasons to believe that a
common law method of case-by-case adjudication of seces-
sionist claims is likely to be a better tool than U.N. Declara-
tions for clarifying the international legal rules governing the
relationship between peoples' self-determination rights and
states' territorial integrity rights.
B. Adjudication as a Tool for Dispute Resolution
One possible objection to the preceding argument is that
it misconceives the function of international adjudication.
The purpose of international adjudication, one might argue, is
not to clarify the law, but rather to resolve concrete disputes.
Hence, the objector persists, the proper test for determining
the value of international adjudication of secessionist dis-
putes is whether adjudication will resolve the dispute, not
whether adjudication will help clarify the law.
This objection, though not without merit, is overstated in
two respects. First, it sets too high a standard to demand
that adjudication, by itself, should achieve a final resolution
of a highly charged political dispute. 9 The proper test for
27. Id. at 285. For further discussion of the Canadian Supreme Court
opinion, see infra notes 121-46 and accompanying text.
28. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 286-88 (Can.).
29. Indeed, the same is true for domestic adjudication. If a judicial decision
is a failure unless it achieves, by itself, a final resolution of a dispute, then
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), would have to be deemed afailure, because the Supreme Court decision, by itself, did not put an end to
school desegregation.
364 [Vol. 42
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success, in any given case, is whether international adjudica-
tion provides a key link in a chain of events that ultimately
leads to a political settlement of the dispute. If so, the adju-
dication should be deemed a success. Second, although dis-
pute resolution is one important function of international
adjudication, the value of clarifying the legal rights and re-
sponsibilities of the parties to a dispute should not be under-
estimated. If, in a particular case, adjudication helps clarify
those legal rights and responsibilities, but the dispute re-
mains unresolved, the adjudication can still be considered a
partial success. Adjudication should be deemed a failure only
in cases where the legal judgment or opinion actually hinders
a political settlement of the dispute.
There are two cases in which the I.C.J. has adjudicated
disputes involving a conflict between a group's self-
determination rights and a state's territorial sovereignty
claim: Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Pres-
ence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwith-
standing Security Council Resolution 276 (1970);"0 and West-
ern Sahara.3 Analysis of these two cases illustrates the
preceding approach to evaluating adjudication as a tool for
dispute resolution.
In 1971, the I.C.J. issued an advisory opinion on the
situation in Namibia.3 The I.C.J. opinion explicitly held that
South Africa's military occupation of Namibia (South West
Africa) was illegal.33 The I.C.J. advisory opinion on Namibia
did not, by itself, persuade South Africa to recognize Na-
mibia's right of independence. However, the I.C.J. opinion
was one of a protracted series of steps that enabled the inter-
national community eventually to persuade South Africa to
recognize Namibia's claim to independence. 4 The Namibian
30. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Af-
rica in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolu-
tion 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
31. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
32. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Af-
rica in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolu-
tion 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
33. See id. at 58.
34. Between 1950 and 1971, the I.C.J. issued four advisory opinions and two
judgments concerning Namibia. See THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELF-
DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 80-85 (1997). After the I.C.J. advi-
sory opinion in 1971, it took another seven years of political dialogue before
South Africa accepted a proposal that outlined a specific plan for Namibian in-
20021
HeinOnline  -- 42 Santa Clara L. Rev.  365 2001-2002
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
adjudication should be deemed a success, not because it
achieved a final resolution of the dispute, but because it was
an important link in a chain of events that ultimately led to a
political settlement of the conflict between South Africa's as-
serted right of territorial sovereignty and Namibia's asserted
right of self-determination.35
In 1975, the I.C.J. issued an advisory opinion on the
situation in Western Sahara." The I.C.J. opinion rejected
Morocco's and Mauritania's claims to sovereignty over the
territory of Western Sahara,37 and affirmed the Sahrawi peo-
ples' right of self-determination. 38  More than twenty-five
years later, Morocco continues to control a significant portion
of the territory of Western Sahara.3 9 Thus, one is tempted to
conclude that the Western Sahara adjudication was a com-
plete failure. However, closer examination shows that the
Western Sahara adjudication is properly characterized as a
partial success.
Approximately four years after the I.C.J. issued its advi-
sory opinion, Mauritania renounced its claim to sovereignty
over the territory of Western Sahara." Since the I.C.J. opin-
ion deprived Mauritania of any legal basis for its territorial
claim, it seems likely that the opinion was, at a minimum,
one of several factors that ultimately persuaded Mauritania
to abandon its territorial claim." Mauritania's renunciation
of its claim simplified the dispute by eliminating one major
party.
dependence. See ISAAK I. DORE, THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATE SYSTEM AND
NAMIBIA 162-64 (1985). Namibia did not actually become independent until
1990. See D.J. Devine, The Relationship Between International Law and Mu-
nicipal Law in Light of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 26 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 295, 297 (1994).
35. I do not wish to overstate the significance of the 1971 I.C.J. advisory
opinion. That opinion was merely one small step in a political process that
spanned forty years. See supra note 34. Even so, by lending the weight of itslegal authority to the political movement for Namibian independence, the I.C.J.
made a small, but significant contribution to the process.
36. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
37. See id. at 68.
38. See id.
39. See U.N. Referendum for Western Sahara: 9 Years and Counting, Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 106th
Cong. 2-4 (2000) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Allen L. Keiswetter, Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs).
40. See S. REP. No. 102-75, at 2 (1992).
41. Another key factor was that continued fighting between Polisario and
Mauritanian forces proved quite costly for Mauritania. See id.
366 [Vol. 42
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Additionally, the I.C.J. advisory opinion arguably made a
modest contribution to promoting the political dialogue be-
tween the Kingdom of Morocco and Polisario, which repre-
sents the Sahrawi people. In 1990, the U.N. Security Council
approved a peace plan, previously agreed between Polisario
and the Kingdom of Morocco, which called for a cease-fire and
a referendum to allow the Sahrawi people to choose between
independence or integration with Morocco.4 2 Although viola-
tions of the cease-fire have occurred, the level of violence de-
clined significantly after the cease-fire agreement.43 And al-
though the promised referendum has still not taken place," it
is questionable whether Morocco would have agreed to a ref-
erendum in the first place if the I.C.J. advisory opinion had
not clearly affirmed the Sahrawi peoples' right to self-
determination.45
In sum, by rejecting Morocco's and Mauritania's territo-
rial claims, and by affirming the Sahrawi peoples' right to
self-determination, the I.C.J. advisory opinion shifted the po-
litical balance slightly in favor of the Sahrawi people, and
thereby contributed to the political pressure that ultimately
persuaded Mauritania to abandon its claim, and persuaded
Morocco to accept, in principle, the idea of a referendum.
There may be cases, however, where a decision reached
by means of international adjudication could actually hinder
efforts to negotiate a political settlement of a secessionist dis-
pute. For example, in some cases a clear judicial decision in
favor of one party may embolden that party to harden its
stance, thereby making political settlement more difficult. If,
in a particular case, there is a sound basis to fear that adjudi-
42. See id. at 3.
43. Compare id. ("Polisario estimates that roughly 13,000 people died from
the fighting" prior to the cease fire agreement.) with Hearing, supra note 39, at
6 (statement of Allen L. Keiswetter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs) (stating that the U.N. peacekeeping force has provided a
"safety net" and that "it helps monitor and keep the cease-fire.").
44. See Hearing, supra note 39 at 2-4 (statement of Allen L. Keiswetter,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs).
45. The Sahrawi peoples' right to self-determination has been backed not
only by the I.C.J., but also by various Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3458, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at
116, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3458 (1975); S.C. Res. 621, U.N. SCOR, 43rd Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/Res/621 (1988). It is possible that these resolutions by themselves would
have persuaded Morocco to agree to a referendum. In any event, the I.C.J.
opinion contributed to the overall political pressure on Morocco that ultimately
induced the Moroccan government to accept the idea of a referendum.
36720021
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cation is likely to hinder the process of political settlement,
then adjudication should be avoided. More broadly, the deci-
sion whether to submit a particular secessionist dispute to an
international adjudicatory body is a political decision that
should be made only after careful consideration of the likely
impact of a judicial decision on efforts to achieve a political
settlement of that particular dispute.46
III. OVERVIEW OF PROCEDURAL OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION
Broadly speaking, there are three types of existing fora
that could be used to adjudicate secessionist claims: domestic
courts, international human rights bodies, and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. The Canadian Supreme Court's deci-
sion in the Quebec case notwithstanding, domestic courts will
generally not be a viable option for adjudication of most se-
cessionist claims.47 Moreover, international human rights
bodies have generally declined to entertain petitions assert-
ing a right to self-determination on the grounds that the peti-
tion mechanism is available only to individuals, not groups,
whereas the right of self-determination belongs to "peoples,"
not individuals. 8 Since domestic courts and international
human rights bodies are generally not viable options in most
cases, this paper focuses on procedural options for adjudicat-
ing secessionist claims before the I.C.J.
Under the current I.C.J. Statute, there are essentially
two procedural mechanisms for bringing a claim before the
46. In evaluating the likely impact of a judicial decision on a particular se-
cessionist dispute, the roles and interests of third parties must be considered.
Virtually every secessionist group that resorts to armed force to press its claim
is dependent upon one or more outside arms suppliers. One likely benefit of ajudicial decision rejecting a secessionist claim is that such a decision would in-
crease pressure upon outside arms suppliers to cease supplying arms to the se-
cessionist group. Indeed, in cases where armed conflict is present, the re-
straining impact on third-party arms suppliers of a judicial decision rejecting an
asserted right of secession may be one of the principal benefits of international
adjudication.
47. Most secessionist groups would not accept the legitimacy of a decision by
a domestic court denying the validity of their secessionist claims, because the
heart of any secessionist claim is a challenge to the state's right to control the
secessionist group, and a domestic court is an organ of the state whose authority
the group is challenging.
48. Dinah Shelton, Self-Determination and Secession: The Jursiprudence of
International Human Rights Tribunals (Mar. 5, 2001) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
[Vol. 42
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court. First, one state can bring a claim against another state
utilizing the procedure for "contentious jurisdiction."49  Sec-
ond, "the court may give an advisory opinion on any legal
question" when requested to do so by a competent U.N. body.5 °
Note that neither mechanism permits a secessionist group it-
self to bring a claim before the I.C.J. The I.C.J., therefore,
can entertain a secessionist group's claim only if a state or a
U.N. body brings the claim to the court. Thus, although peo-
ples' right to self-determination is well-established under in-
ternational law,"1 international law does not provide a reme-
dial mechanism that enables a group seeking to vindicate its
right to self-determination to bring a claim before the I.C.J.
This gap between rights and remedies raises the question
of whether it would be feasible to amend the I.C.J. Statute to
accord standing to "peoples" who allege violations of their
self-determination rights. That question must be answered in
the negative because the five permanent members of the Se-
curity Council each have the power to veto any proposed
amendment to the I.C.J. Statute.52 Given the numerous mi-
norities problems that both Russia and China confront, they
would presumably veto any proposed amendment to the I.C.J.
Statute that would accord standing to groups who assert vio-
lations of their self-determination rights.
Another option for closing the gap between groups' self-
determination rights and their lack of remedial rights would
be to establish a new adjudicatory body, an "International
Court of Self-Determination," in which groups alleging viola-
tions of their self-determination rights would have standing
to bring such claims. Although this option should not be ex-
cluded as a long-term possibility, it is clearly not a near-term
option. Hence, the remainder of this essay focuses on two
specific procedural options: Part IV discusses the I.C.J.'s con-
tentious jurisdiction, and Part V addresses the I.C.J.'s advi-
sory jurisdiction.
49. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 3, art. 34, para. 1 ("Only states may be
parties in cases before the Court.").
50. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 3, art. 65, para. 1.
51. See supra note 6.
52. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 3, art. 69 ("Amendments to the present
Statute shall be effected by the same procedure as is provided by the Charter of
the United Nations for amendments to that Charter."); U.N. CHARTER art. 108
(requiring ratification by all the permanent members of the Security Council
before an amendment enters into force).
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IV. THE I.C.J.'s CONTENTIOUS JURISDICTION
Suppose that group G is the dominant ethnic group in a
defined territory located within the boundaries of state S.
Group G claims that state S is violating its right to self-
determination. Group G seeks international recognition of its
asserted right to secede from state S and establish its own
state. Group G cannot bring a claim against state S before
the I.C.J. because "[o]nly states may be parties in cases before
the Court."5 Suppose, though, that state P (the petitioner),
which is sympathetic to group G's cause, brings a claim on
behalf of group G against state S. There are two main proce-
dural obstacles to adjudication of P's claim. First, P must es-
tablish that S has consented to I.C.J. adjudication of the
claim. Second, P must establish that it has standing to bring
the claim on behalf of Group G. Let us consider each in turn.
A. The Requirement of Consent
For the I.C.J. to adjudicate a case under its contentious
jurisdiction, the states who are parties to the dispute must
agree to submit the case to the court.54 That agreement can
take one of several different forms. The states could agree on
a one-time basis to submit a particular dispute to the court."
Or, if the states concerned are parties to a treaty that pro-
vides for I.C.J. jurisdiction over treaty-related disputes, ac-
cession to the treaty constitutes agreement to submit such
disputes to the court.56 Finally, sixty-three states have sub-
mitted unilateral declarations pursuant to article 36(2) of the
I.C.J. Statute, 7 accepting the "compulsory jurisdiction" of the
court over a wide range of international disputes."
53. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 3, art. 34, para. 1.
54. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 3, arts. 34-36.
55. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 3, art. 36, para. 1 ("The jurisdiction of the
Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it ....").
56. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, art. IX, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 282 ("Disputes be-
tween the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or ful-
fillment of the present Convention... shall be submitted to the International
Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.").
57. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 3, art. 36, para. 2 ("The states parties to the
present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso
facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the
same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court" over specified types of legal dis-
putes.).
58. See INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: DECLARATIONS RECOGNIZING AS
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It is difficult to conceive of many cases where a state
would consent on a one-time basis to I.C.J. jurisdiction over a
claim involving a group's asserted right to secede from that
state.59 Although there may be isolated examples where I.C.J.
jurisdiction over a secessionist claim could be based on a
treaty, this author has been unable to identify any such ex-
ample. Therefore, the most plausible basis for establishing
consent would be a unilateral declaration pursuant to article
36 of the I.C.J. Statute.
Unfortunately for those advocating secession, the major-
ity of groups with potential secessionist claims live in states
that do not have current article 36 declarations on file with
the I.C.J. The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organiza-
tion ("UNPO") is an international non-profit group whose
membership consists of "peoples" that seek to vindicate their
self-determination rights." UNPO currently has fifty-two
members, only ten of which live wholly or partially in states
that have current article 36 declarations. 61 The other forty-
two UNPO members live in states that have not filed article
36 declarations. Therefore, those forty-two groups cannot in-
COMPULSORY THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicdeclarations.htm (visited Feb-
ruary 18, 2001). The total of sixty-three states includes declarations "which had
not expired by effluxion of time, or whose withdrawal or replacement had not
been notified by 31 July 1999." Id.
59. The case of Quebec and Canada may be one such case, but even the Ca-
nadians, who have a more favorable attitude towards international law than
many other countries, might well be reluctant to submit the Quebec question to
the I.C.J.
60. See UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES ORGANISATION at
http://www.unpo.org (visited Feb. 17, 2001). Not every group seeking greater
self-determination rights is a member of UNPO, and not every UNPO member
is a secessionist group. Nevertheless, since there is no authoritative list of
groups with secessionist aspirations, the UNPO membership list can provide a
rough proxy for the set of groups with potential secessionist claims.
61. For a list of UNPO's members, see id. For a list of states that have cur-
rent article 36 declarations, see INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note
58. A comparison of the two sources reveals seven UNPO members that are
situated entirely within a single country that has filed an article 36 declaration:
Abkhazia (Georgia), Aborigines (Australia), Cordilerra (Philippines), Kosovo
(Yugoslavia), Nuxalk Nation (Canada), Ogoni (Nigeria) and Sanjak (Yugosla-
via). One other UNPO member includes people living in two countries, both of
whom have filed article 36 declarations: Scania (Sweden and Denmark). Two
other UNPO members are divided among two or more states, some of which
have not filed article 36 declarations. The Rusyn people live in Ukraine, Poland
and Slovakia; only Poland has filed an article 36 declaration. Nagaland is di-
vided between India and Burma; only India has filed an article 36 declaration.
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voke a unilateral declaration under article 36 to establish
their host states' consent to the I.C.J.'s contentious jurisdic-
tion.
Even the groups that live in states that have filed article
36 declarations will find it difficult to utilize those declara-
tions to establish the states' consent to adjudication of a claim
involving an alleged right of secession, because most states'
article 36 declarations are subject to provisos that might well
be interpreted to preclude adjudication of secessionist
claims.62 Consider two examples. First, suppose that a sym-
pathetic state filed a claim against Yugoslavia on behalf of
the Kosovars, asserting that Kosovo has a right to secede
from Yugoslavia. Although Yugoslavia has filed an article 36
declaration accepting the court's compulsory jurisdiction, its
declaration specifically excludes I.C.J. jurisdiction over "terri-
torial disputes."63 The court might well find that a claim as-
serting that Kosovo has a right to secede from Yugoslavia is a
"territorial dispute" over which the I.C.J. could not exercise
jurisdiction.
Alternatively, suppose that a sympathetic state filed a
claim against Spain on behalf of the Basques, asserting that
the Basques have a right to secede from Spain.64 Although
Spain has filed an article 36 declaration accepting the court's
compulsory jurisdiction, its declaration specifically excludes
I.C.J. jurisdiction over "[dlisputes arising prior to the date on
which this Declaration was deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations or relating to events or situa-
tions which occurred prior to that date, even if such events or
situations may continue to occur or to have effects thereaf-
ter. '65 Inasmuch as Spain deposited its declaration on Octo-
ber 29, 1990,66 and the dispute with the Basques arguably
relates to events or situations which occurred prior to that
date,67 it is uncertain whether the I.C.J. would be prepared to
62. See DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 602-786
(Shabtai Rosenne ed., 3d ed. 1991) (reproducing the texts of all article 36 decla-
rations filed with the I.C.J.).
63. See INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 58.
64. For an excellent summary of the Basque situation, see HURST HANNUM,
AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION
OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 263-79 (rev. ed. 1996).
65. DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 62,
at 753.
66. See id. at 752.
67. See HANNUM, supra note 64, at 263-79.
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assert jurisdiction over a claim against Spain involving an
alleged Basque right of secession.
Finally, even assuming that there is a state S that has
filed an article 36 declaration without any provisos that
would preclude adjudication of secessionist claims, and as-
suming that there is a group G that wants to secede from that
state S, the only state that could bring a claim on behalf of
group G would be a state that has filed an article 36 declara-
tion itself, because the I.C.J. Statute limits the Court's com-
pulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2) to disputes between
states that have both filed article 36 declarations.68
In light of the above, it is uncertain whether any seces-
sionist group could successfully argue that the state from
which it wants to secede has consented to the I.C.J.'s exercise
of contentious jurisdiction over its secessionist claim. Moreo-
ver, even assuming that group G could establish that state S
had consented to the I.C.J.'s contentious jurisdiction, the peti-
tioner state (P) would still have to show that it had standing
to bring a claim on behalf of group G.
B. The Requirement of Standing
In the hypothetical case in which state P brings a claim
against state S to vindicate group G's right to self-
determination, there are three distinct theories P could ad-
vance to establish its standing to bring the claim. P could
bring the claim as an actio popularis; it could bring the claim
as parens patriae for group G; or P could assert a particular
legal interest in conducting economic and/or political relations
with group G. All three are problematic. Consider each in
turn.
1. Actio Popularis
Actio popularis can be defined as "an action brought by a
plaintiff before a court in the general interest, without any
need to show an individual interest in pursuing the claim."69
In the South West Africa cases, the I.C.J. explicitly stated
68. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 3, art. 36, para. 2 (authorizing states to
file declarations stating that "they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and with-
out special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obliga-
tion, the jurisdiction of the Court .... " (emphasis added)).
69. MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
ERGA OMNES 210 (1997).
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that a plaintiffs asserted right to bring an actio popularis "is
not known to international law as it stands at present. 7 °
However, four years later, the I.C.J. stated in the Barce-
lona Traction case that international law does recognize the
concept of obligations erga omnes.71 The court defined obliga-
tions erga omnes as "obligations of a State towards the inter-
national community as a whole, 72 and distinguished them
from obligations "vis-a-vis another State."73 Importantly, the
court stated that "all States can be held to have a legal inter-
est in" the protection of obligations erga omnes."
In the East Timor case, the Court explicitly recognized
"that the right of peoples to self-determination... has an
erga omnes character. 75  Moreover, in the Nicaragua case,
Judge Schwebel commented that the court's earlier statement
(in the Southwest Africa cases) about the inadmissibility of an
actio popularis "was rapidly and decisively replaced" by the
court's dictum in Barcelona Traction to the effect that all
states have a legal interest in the protection of obligations
erga omnes." Thus, in the preceding hypothetical, state P
could plausibly argue (1) that state S has an erga omnes obli-
gation to respect group G's right to self-determination (as ex-
plicitly recognized by the court in the East Timor case), and
(2) that the erga omnes character of that obligation gives
state P a right to bring an actio popularis against state S on
behalf of group G (as suggested by Judge Schwebel in the
Nicaragua case).
P's chances of winning this argument are uncertain, at
best. The I.C.J.'s statement in the East Timor case that the
right of self-determination has an erga omnes character must
be viewed in context. East Timor was once a Portuguese col-
ony, and later became a non-self-governing territory under
Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter. Since the right of self-
70. South West Africa, Second Phase (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966
I.C.J. 4, 47 (Jul. 18).
71. See Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 (June 30).
76. Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1984 I.C.J. 169, 197 (May 10)
(Schwebel, J., dissenting).
77. See Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 95-96 (June
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determination outside the colonial context is less firmly en-
trenched in international law than the right of colonial peo-
ples' to self-determination, 8 there is reason to doubt whether
the I.C.J. would hold that the right of non-colonial peoples to
self-determination has an erga omnes character. Moreover,
even assuming that states have an erga omnes duty to respect
the right of non-colonial peoples to self determination, it does
not necessarily follow that every state can bring an actio
popularis to vindicate those self-determination rights. Judge
Schwebel's comment in the Nicaragua case notwithstanding,
the dominant view is that "the concept of obligations erga
omnes does not necessarily imply the existence of a sort of ac-
tio popularis.
2. Parens patriae
As an alternative to an actio popularis, P could attempt
to bring a claim as parens patriae for group G. Parens patriae
is "[a] doctrine by which a government has standing to prose-
cute a lawsuit on behalf of ... someone who is under a legal
disability to prosecute the suit."" The theory is that, since
group G has an established right to self-determination under
international law, but group G lacks the legal capacity to
bring its own claim because it is not a "state," the court
should allow state P to bring the claim on behalf of group G.
Article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute authorizes the court to adjudi-
cate disputes by applying "the general principles of law rec-
ognized by civilized nations."8' Thus, P could argue that the
doctrine of parens patriae is a "general principle of law recog-
nized by civilized nations," which the court is authorized to
apply under article 38.
Not surprisingly, there are several cases in which a state
has litigated a claim before the I.C.J. as parens patriae on be-
half of its own citizens.82 There are even a few cases in which
30).
78. See generally CASSESE, supra note 11, at 126-33.
79. RAGAZZI, supra note 69, at 212. See also 3 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-1966, at 1203 (1997) (not-
ing that the Court "has not introduced the conception of... actio popularis into
international law, even for the protection of what are sometime regarded as ob-
ligations erga omnes.").
80. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999).
81. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 3, art. 38, para. 1(c).
82. See, e.g., Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia (Serb. &
2002] 375
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a state has litigated a claim before the I.C.J. as parens pa-
triae "on behalf of a semi-independent political unit which it
is arguable enjoys some recognizable international personal-
ity as a State even though not as an independent State.""
Professor Rosenne has identified four such cases: the U.S.
Nationals in Morocco case,84 where France was proceeding
"both on its own account and as Protecting Power in Mo-
rocco";85 the Minquiers and Ecrehos case," where the United
Kingdom "was espousing the claim of the Island of Jersey";87
the Jan Mayen case," where Denmark was litigating on be-
half of Greenland's interests; and the Request for Examina-
tion case,8 9 where "the Government of New Zealand expressly
stated that it was also representing the dependent territories
of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau.""
The first two cases, U.S. Nationals in Morocco and Min-
quiers and Ecrehos, may support the proposition that a state
can bring a parens patriae claim on behalf of individuals who
are not, strictly speaking, citizens of that state.9' However, in
Mont.)), 1993 I.C.J. 3, 7 (Apr. 8) (stating that Bosnia and Herzegovina requested
the Court to declare that Yugoslavia "has an obligation to pay Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens, reparations for
damages... "); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 19 (June 27) (stating that Nicaragua requested the Court to declare that the
"United States has an obligation to pay Nicaragua, in its own right and as par-
ens patriae for the citizens of Nicaragua, reparations for damages ...
83. ROSENNE, supra note 79, at 612.
84. Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Mo-
rocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 27).
85. ROSENNE, supra note 79, at 612.
86. Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17).
87. ROSENNE, supra note 79, at 612.
88. Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and
Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14).
89. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Para-
graph 63 of the Court's Judgement of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests
(N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288 (Sept. 22).
90. ROSENNE, supra note 79, at 612. The Court did not use the term "par-
ens patriae" in any of these cases, but the Court was effectively allowing the
states to litigate as parens patriae on behalf of the "semi-independent" political
units.
91. In U.S. Nationals in Morocco, the I.C.J. noted that, although Morocco
was a protectorate of France, Morocco "retained its personality as a State in in-
ternational law." 1952 I.C.J. 176, 185. Thus, it is unclear whether, at that
time, the Moroccan nationals whom France was representing were deemed to be
French citizens or Moroccan citizens. In Minquiers and Ecrehos, the United
Kingdom was espousing the claim of the Island of Jersey, which is part of the
Channel Islands. The Channel Islands are "not part of the United Kingdom,
though in some legal contexts the term 'United Kingdom' is deemed to includeHeinOnline  -- 42 Santa Clara L. Rev.  376 2001-2002
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each of the four cases cited in the previous paragraph, the
political unit that Professor Rosenne describes as "semi-
independent" could also be described as "semi-dependent."92
Thus, there is no case in which the I.C.J. has allowed a state
to bring a parens patriae claim on behalf of a group that did
not have some type of dependency relationship with the state
bringing the claim.
In the hypothetical case discussed above, state P seeks to
bring a claim against state S to vindicate the self-
determination rights of group G, and the members of group G
are citizens of state S. Thus, not only is state P attempting to
represent individuals who are not citizens of state P: it is at-
tempting to represent them in a claim against the state where
they are citizens! In this type of circumstance, it is unlikely
that the I.C.J. would allow state P to bring a claim as parens
patriae on behalf of group G.
Even so, there are two types of cases where P may be
able to bring a parens patriae claim on behalf of group G.
First, if P is a former colonial power, and G is its former col-
ony, P may have standing to bring a claim on behalf of G.
This was the basis for Portugal's asserted standing to bring a
claim against Australia on behalf of East Timor's right to self-
determination.93 For similar reasons, Spain might have
them." Sue Farron et al., Public Perception of the Legal Profession: Attitudinal
Surveys as a Basis for Change, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 79, 82-83 (1996). At least one
U.S. court has held that corporations of the Channel Islands are U.K. citizens
for purposes of alienage jurisdiction. Cedec Trading Ltd. v. United Am. Coal
Sales, Inc., 556 F.Supp. 722, 723-24 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Even so, it is un-
clear whether Channel Islands residents are "citizens" of the United Kingdom
for other purposes.
92. For a discussion of the relationship between Greenland and Denmark,
see HANNUM, supra note 64, at 341-46. For a discussion of the relationship be-
tween Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau and New Zealand, see id. at 384-89. On the
relationship between the Island of Jersey and the United Kingdom, see Farron
et al., supra note 91, at 80-83. With respect to Morocco and France, see Con-
cerning Rights of Nationals of the United States in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952
I.C.J. 175, 185-86.
93. See Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 94 (June 30)
(Portugal asked the Court to declare that "the duties, powers and rights of Por-
tugal as the administering Power of the Territory of East Timor are opposable
to Australia," and that Australia "has infringed and is infringing the right of the
people of East Timor to self-determination"). The Court did not reach the issue
of Portugal's standing, because it dismissed the case on the grounds that it
"could not rule on the lawfulness of the conduct" of Australia "when its judg-
ment would imply an evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct of" Indonesia,
which was not a party to the case. Id. at 102.
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standing to bring a claim against Morocco on behalf of the
Sahrawis' right to self-determination. 4 Second, where group
G is an ethnic minority in state S, and group G has a common
ethnic heritage with the majority ethnic group in state P, the
I.C.J. might hold that P has standing to bring a claim on be-
half of group G.95 Thus, for example, it is possible that the
I.C.J. might recognize Albania's standing to bring a claim
against Yugoslavia on behalf of Kosovo's right to self-
determination. 6
3. Special Economic or Political Interest
If the actio popularis and parens patriae theories both
fail, state P could assert that it has a special economic and/or
political interest in establishing a relationship with group G,
which is being frustrated because state S has imposed un-
warranted restrictions on group G's self-determination rights.
Suppose, for example, that the political leadership of group G
has negotiated a deal with the XYZ company, a company
based in state P, to invest in the mining industry in the area
occupied by group G. State S refuses to allow the foreign in-
vestment because state S wishes to assert control over the
mineral resources at issue. Group G claims that state S is re-
stricting its right to self-determination: in particular, the
right to "freely dispose of [its] natural wealth and resources."97
State P brings a claim against state S. State P alleges that,
by imposing unwarranted restrictions on group G's self-
determination rights, state S has harmed state P's interest
(and the XYZ company's interest) in foreign investment.
State P brings the claim to represent the legal interests of
XYZ company, but the remedy it seeks includes greater self-
94. Note, though, that Spain's claim would fail for lack of Moroccan consent,
because Morocco does not have a current article 36 declaration. See
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 58.
95. There is some precedent for this type of claim in decisions of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice ("P.C.I.J.," the predecessor to the present
court) interpreting the so-called "minorities treaties." See MUSGRAVE, supra
note 34, at 48-55. However, those decisions were taken in the context of specific
treaty regimes, and it is uncertain whether the P.C.I.J.'s standing analysis
would apply to claims that are not based on the minorities treaties.
96. As noted above, it is unclear whether Yugoslavia would be deemed to
have consented to such a suit under its article 36 declaration. See supra text
accompanying note 63.
97. ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 1, para. 2; ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 1, para.
378 [Vol. 42
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determination rights for group G.
In this type of case, state P would almost certainly have
standing to bring the claim. 9 Note, however, that the facts
described are very unlikely to give rise to a judgment order-
ing secession as a remedy. Even if the I.C.J. held that state S
violated group G's right of self-determination, and even if the
I.C.J. held that group G, not state S, had the right to exercise
control over the mineral resources, there is no reason to be-
lieve, based on these facts, that secession would be the appro-
priate remedy. At most, the I.C.J. might order state S to
grant group G greater control over the natural resources in
its region.
In sum, there are likely to be very few, if any, cases in
which the I.C.J. would recognize state P's standing to bring a
claim against state S asserting group G's right to secede from
state S. Moreover, even assuming that there are some cases
in which state P could establish its standing, the claim would
probably be barred on the ground that state S had not con-
sented to the exercise of the I.C.J.'s contentious jurisdiction
over the claim. Therefore, attempts to invoke the I.C.J.'s con-
tentious jurisdiction to adjudicate secessionist claims are un-
likely to succeed.
V. I.C.J. ADVISORY OPINIONS AND THE CASE OF TIBET
Part V addresses the use of I.C.J. advisory opinions as a
mechanism for adjudicating secessionist claims. The discus-
sion refers to the Tibetan situation to illustrate various issues
that will arise in any attempt to obtain an I.C.J. advisory
opinion on a secessionist claim. The analysis is divided into
three sections: (a) the request for an advisory opinion; (b) the
advisory opinion as a tool for clarifying the scope of legal
rights; and (c) the advisory opinion as a tool for facilitating
political resolution of disputes.
A. The Request for an Advisory Opinion
The I.C.J. Statute authorizes the court to "give an advi-
sory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever
98. See ROSENNE, supra note 79, at 1215 ("[I]t is accepted that the right of
diplomatic protection of a national is sufficient to justify an international claim
in respect of injuries suffered by that national."). Note that the conclusion that
P has standing to bring the claim says nothing about the merits of P's claim, or
whether state S has consented to jurisdiction.
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body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations to make such a request."99 The U.N.
Charter specifically authorizes the General Assembly and the
Security Council to request advisory opinions.0 0 Additionally,
other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies
may request advisory opinions "on legal questions arising
within the scope of their activities," but only if they are spe-
cifically authorized to do so by the General Assembly.01 The
U.N. Charter does not authorize member states to request
I.C.J. advisory opinions.
The question arises which "other organs" are authorized
to request an I.C.J. advisory opinion concerning Tibet's as-
serted right to secede from China. In addition to the General
Assembly, the Security Council, and the I.C.J., the U.N.
Charter establishes three other "principal organs" of the
United Nations: the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat and
the Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC").' The Secre-
tariat is not authorized to request advisory opinions from the
court, O and the Trusteeship Council is now defunct.' How-
ever, a 1946 General Assembly resolution granted ECOSOC a
general authorization to request I.C.J. advisory opinions on
legal questions arising within the scope of ECOSOC's activi-
ties. '
The question of a right of secession is clearly within the
scope of ECOSOC's activities, because the Commission on
Human Rights, which is a subsidiary organ of ECOSOC, °6
was responsible for drafting the Human Rights Covenants,
and the legal argument for Tibet's right to secede derives, at
least in part, from the right to self-determination codified in
common article 1 of those Covenants. 107 Therefore, ECOSOC
could request an I.C.J. advisory opinion on Tibet's asserted
right to secede from China.
99. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 3, art. 65, para. 1.
100. See U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 1.
101. See id. art. 96, para. 2.
102. See id. art. 7, para. 1.
103. See ROSENNE, supra note 79, at 333-35.
104. See id. at 332.
105. See id. at 327-28.
106. See THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
128 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
107. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
108. In this regard, it is noteworthy that ECOSOC has requested only two
advisory opinions from the Court, and both requests were made in response to
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The "principal organs" created by the Charter have in
turn created numerous "subsidiary organs." The General As-
sembly has authorized only two subsidiary organs to request
I.C.J. advisory opinions: the Interim Committee for the Gen-
eral Assembly and the Committee for Applications for the Re-
view of Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal.1"9 Those
two organs cannot request advisory opinions pertaining to an
alleged right of secession because they are authorized to re-
quest opinions only "on legal questions arising within the
scope of their activities." 0°
The General Assembly has also authorized several spe-
cialized agencies to request advisory opinions."' However,
the court has strictly interpreted the requirement that spe-
cialized agencies may request advisory opinions only "on legal
questions arising within the scope of their activities.""2 Since
the legal question of an asserted right of secession does not
appear to arise within the scope of activity of any specialized
agency, the court would probably not give an advisory opinion
on that question in response to a request from a specialized
agency.
Thus, as a practical matter, any group that wished to ob-
tain an I.C.J. advisory opinion on an alleged Tibetan right of
secession would have to persuade either the General Assem-
bly or ECOSOC to approve the request."' In principle, the
I.C.J. has the discretion to refuse to give an advisory opinion,
the Human Rights Commission's recommendation that ECOSOC should request
an advisory opinion from the Court. See DIFFERENCE RELATING TO IMMUNITY
FROM LEGAL PROCESS OF A SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR OF THE COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/inuma/inumaframe.htm; Applicability of Article VI, Sec-
tion 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Na-
tions, 1989 I.C.J. 9 (June 14).
109. See ROSENNE, supra note 79, at 335.
110. U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 2.
111. See ROSENNE, supra note 79, at 339-42.
112. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 235-37 (rejecting World Heath Organization's request for an advisory
opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons because the question did
not arise within the scope of the agency's activities). See also ROSENNE, supra
note 79, at 996 (stating the Nuclear Weapons case "is the only instance in the
present Court of a finding that the Court could not give the requested opinion
because to ask the question was not within the scope of the activities of the or-
gan making the request.").
113. The Security Council clearly has the authority to request such an opin-
ion, but China would presumably veto any Security Council resolution to obtain
an advisory opinion on an alleged Tibetan right of secession.
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even after ECOSOC or the General Assembly has requested
it." 4 However, the court has emphasized that "[a] reply to a
request for an [advisory] opinion should not, in principle, be
refused."" 5 Indeed, the court has never refused to give an ad-
visory opinion when requested to do so by a principal U.N. or-
gan.116
Given the court's strong bias in favor of giving advisory
opinions when requested to do so, the need to obtain a major-
ity vote in either ECOSOC or the General Assembly"7 is the
only significant procedural hurdle inhibiting I.C.J. adjudica-
tion of secessionist claims."' The magnitude of that hurdle
114. See ROSENNE, supra note 79, at 1013-29.
115. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 19 (May 28). The Court has stated,
It is well settled in the Court's jurisprudence that when a re-
quest is made under Article 96 of the Charter by an organ of the
United Nations or a specialized agency for an advisory opinion
by way of guidance or enlightenment on a question of law, the
Court should entertain the request and give its opinion unless
there are "compelling reasons" to the contrary.
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on Privileges and Im-
munities of the United Nations, 1989 I.C.J. 9, 191 (June 14).
116. In one case the Court refused to give an advisory opinion when re-
quested by a specialized agency. See supra note 112. In the Eastern Carelia
case, Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser B) No. 5 (July 23), the Permanent
Court of International Justice refused to give an advisory opinion on the
grounds that the request concerned a dispute between two states, and it could
not adjudicate the dispute without their consent. See ROSENNE, supra note 79,
at 1014. The present Court has not rejected the rationale of Eastern Carelia,
but it has construed the holding narrowly, and has rendered several advisory
opinions despite states' attempts to invoke Eastern Carelia in support of argu-
ments that the Court should refuse to render a requested advisory opinion. See
id. at 1013-29.
117. All ECOSOC decisions are "made by a majority of the members present
and voting." U.N. Charter art. 67, para. 2. ECOSOC has fifty-four members.
Id. art. 61, para. 1 (as amended). General Assembly resolutions require a two-
thirds majority for "important questions," and a simple majority for other ques-
tions. Id. art. 18. In both cases, the majority requirements are determined on
the basis of members "present and voting." Id. arts. 18 and 67. According to
Professor Rosenne, "[piractice does not permit a clear answer" to the question of
whether a request for an advisory opinion requires a simple or a two-thirds
majority. See ROSENNE, supra note 79, at 301.
118. In theory, one could circumvent that hurdle by obtaining a favorable
vote in the Security Council. However, Russia and/or China would probably
veto any Security Council resolution requesting an I.C.J. advisory opinion on an
alleged right of secession, even if the particular secessionist group did not reside
in Russia or China, because both countries have significant concerns about their
own secessionist groups, and they would not want to fuel their own secessionist
movements by voting in favor of a resolution related to a secessionist group in
some other country.
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should not be underestimated. Even in the case of a pariah
state, such as Iraq, there would likely be significant political
opposition to a resolution requesting an advisory opinion on a
secessionist claim,"9 because states might well fear that a de-
cision to approve one such resolution would lead to a multi-
tude of similar claims. In the case of Tibet, the political ob-
stacles are even greater, because many states that do not care
about offending Iraq would be reluctant to offend China by
voting in favor of a resolution requesting an advisory opinion
on Tibetan secession.
120
In addition to these political factors, the ECOSOC and/or
the General Assembly would have to consider two other im-
portant factors before deciding to request an I.C.J. advisory
opinion on a secessionist claim. First, to what extent would
an advisory opinion help clarify the scope of a legal right of
secession? Second, to what extent would an advisory opinion
promote or hinder the process of political dialogue? The fol-
lowing two sections address these questions in the context of
the Tibetan case.
B. An Advisory Opinion on Tibet Would Help Clarify the
Scope of a Legal Right of Secession
In its decision on the Quebec secession issue,"' the Cana-
dian Supreme Court identified three categories of cases in
which a group could make a plausible legal claim for an in-
ternational right of secession: (1) situations involving former
colonies; (2) cases involving foreign military occupation; and
(3) situations where "a people is blocked from the meaningful
exercise of its right to self-determination internally.""' As the
Canadian Supreme Court noted, "[tlhe right of colonial peo-
ples to exercise their right of self-determination by breaking
119. Iraq faces a potential secessionist threat from the Kurds. See generally
HANNUM supra note 64, at 178-202.
120. China's success in blocking unfavorable resolutions in the Commission
on Human Rights does not bode well for any attempt to pass an ECOSOC or
General Assembly resolution requesting an I.C.J. advisory opinion on Tibet.
See Michael J. Dennis, The Fifty-Fifth Session of the UN Commission on Human
Rights, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 189, 196 (2000) (stating that China successfully
blocked a U.S. resolution condemning "severe" restrictions on human rights in
China, and that "[tihe defeat marked China's eighth escape from censure since
its assault on unarmed protesters at Tiananmen Square in 1989").
121. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
122. Id. at 285.
38320021
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away from the 'imperial' power is now undisputed.' 12' Hence,
there is little need to clarify the scope of that legal right.'24
However, an I.C.J. advisory opinion could help clarify the
scope of an international legal right of secession, if any, under
the latter two categories.
The Canadian Supreme Court's second category, foreign
military occupation, derives from the 1970 Declaration on
Friendly Relations, which stated that "subjection of peoples to
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a
violation of the principle" of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.'2 ' The phrase "alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation" has been repeated in subse-
quent U.N. Declarations."6 Unfortunately, neither the Gen-
eral Assembly nor any other international political or judicial
body has clarified the precise meaning of that phrase."7
There are few places in the world today where a group
can plausibly claim to be the victim of "alien subjugation," but
Tibet is certainly one of them."8  The history of Chinese-
Tibetan relations is hotly contested,"9 but it is clear that
China had no significant political or military presence in Ti-
bet from 1913, when the Dalai Lama declared Tibet inde-
pendent, until 1950, when Chinese troops invaded Tibet"
Since 1950, China has maintained a substantial military
presence and has exercised effective political control over Ti-
123. Id.
124. As a practical matter, virtually all colonial peoples have exercised their
right to choose independence from the colonial power. For a summary of situa-
tions where colonial peoples' right to self-determination has not been fully exer-
cised, see CASSESE, supra note 11, at 79-88.
125. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 14, at 121.
126. See Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United
Nations, supra note 18, at 13; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, su-
pra note 17.
127. See CASSESE, supra note 11, at 90-99 (analyzing the scope and content of
the right to be free from alien, subjugation, domination and exploitation).
128. See Eric Kolodner, Population Transfer: The Effects of Settler Infusion
Policies on a Host Population's Right to Self-Determination, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 159, 185 (1994) ("Tibet remains the largest territory to be stripped of
its sovereignty since the end of World War II.").
129. See MICHAEL VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, THE STATUS OF TIBET (1987) (pre-
senting a detailed argument in favor of Tibetan independence and rebutting
various Chinese claims).
130. See Kolodner, supra note 128, at 185-88; W. Gary Vause, Tibet to
Tienanmen: Chinese Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 1575, 1577 n.8 (1989).
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bet.' China insists that Tibet is not a victim of foreign mili-
tary occupation, or "alien subjugation," because "China con-
siders Tibet to be among those regions justifiably within
China's historical claims of sovereignty."13 ' However, in 1961,
the General Assembly approved a resolution calling on China
to cease "practices which deprive the Tibetan people of
their... right to self-determination." 3' Thirty years later,
the United States Congress "determined that Tibet is an oc-
cupied sovereign country under international law."3 4
An I.C.J. advisory opinion on Tibet would provide a
unique opportunity for the court to help clarify the law in this
area. The question whether Tibet was an independent state
prior to the 1950 Chinese invasion is a legal question to
which international law can provide a legal answer. Moreo-
ver, the I.C.J. has particular expertise in the type of legal and
historical analysis required to answer this question. If the
court determined that Tibet was an independent state prior
to 1950, it would then have to decide whether the Tibetan
people have a right to secede from China, or whether events
since 1950 have legitimated Chinese territorial sovereignty
over Tibet. Regardless of how the court answered these ques-
tions, the answers would invariably help clarify the meaning
of the phrase "alien subjugation, domination and exploita-
tion.""' In addition, the court's opinion could also help clarify
whether, and under what circumstances, international law
grants a right of secession to the victims of foreign military
occupation.
The Canadian Supreme Court's third category includes
cases where "a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise
of its right to self-determination internally," i.e., within the
131. According to one estimate, there are 400,000 Chinese troops perma-
nently housed in Tibet. Kolodner, supra note 128, at 187. The troops "are there
not only to counter perceived threats from without by states like India, but also
to suppress opposition from within." Vause, supra note 130, at 1579.
132. Vause, supra note 130, at 1580.
133. G.A. Res. 1723, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 72, U.N. Doc.
A/5100 (1961).
134. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub.
L. No. 103-236, § 536(a), 108 Stat. 481 (1994) (expressing the sense of the Con-
gress that the United States should establish a dialogue with the Dalai Lama as
the "true representative" of the Tibetan people, and requiring the Secretary of
State to submit an annual report to Congress on the state of relations between
the United States and the Tibetan government-in-exile).
135. This statement assumes that if Tibet was independent before 1950, then
the 1950 invasion constitutes "alien subjugation, domination and exploitation."
38520021
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established state.'36 The Court acknowledged that "it remains
unclear whether this third proposition actually reflects an es-
tablished international law standard."'37 Regardless, several
commentators have espoused the underlying principle that
international law should recognize a remedial right of seces-
sion in cases where a state refuses to "cease serious injustices
it is perpetrating against the seceding group."138
Even if the I.C.J. concludes that Tibet is not a victim of
foreign military occupation, Tibet can plausibly claim a right
of secession under the "serious injustices" category. There is
extensive documentation of Chinese human rights abuses in
Tibet.139  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, China imple-
mented a systematic policy to destroy Tibetan Buddhist cul-
ture; by 1976, "only thirteen of Tibet's 6,254 monasteries re-
mained standing."140 In 1960, the International Commission
of Jurists "found that acts of genocide had been committed in
Tibet in an attempt to destroy the Tibetans as a religious
group.' ' 1
Chinese human rights abuses in Tibet continued
throughout the 1990s. 141 As recently as 1996, commentators
concluded that Chinese family planning policies, as applied to
Tibetans, "are a form of ethnic cleansing" and "may constitute
a violation of" the Genocide Convention.143 Another commen-
tator has argued that China's population transfer policy, i.e.,
the policy of encouraging ethnic Chinese to move to Tibet, so
136. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 285 (Can.).
137. Id.
138. BUCHANAN, supra note 11, at 152. See also CASSESE, supra note 11, at
359 (supporting a right of secession where "the central authorities of a multina-
tional State are irremediably oppressive and despotic, persistently violate the
basic rights of minorities and no peaceful and constructive solution can be en-
visaged").
139. See JOHN AVEDON, IN EXILE FROM THE LAND OF SNOWS (1984). See also
infra notes 140-43.
140. Kolodner, supra note 128, at 186.
141. LEGAL INQUIRY COMM. ON TIBET, INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, TIBET AND
THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 3 (1960).
142. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES 2000 (Tibet addendum to China report) available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eap/index.cfm?docid=684 ("Chinese
government authorities continued to commit numerous serious human rights
abuses in Tibet, including instances of torture, arbitrary arrest, detention with-
out public trial, and lengthy detention of Tibetan nationalists for peacefully ex-
pressing their political or religious views.").
143. See Eva Herzer & Sara B. Levin, China's Denial of Tibetan Women's
Right to Reproductive Freedom, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 551, 556 (1996).
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that Chinese now outnumber Tibetans in the region.. is mo-
tivated by discriminatory intent and violates the Tibetan
peoples' right to self-determination.'45
An I.C.J. advisory opinion on Tibet could enable the court
to provide an authoritative legal opinion as to whether, and if
so under what conditions, serious injustices perpetrated by a
state against a minority group can give rise to a remedial
right of secession. There are numerous minority groups in
the world today that are victims of state-sanctioned oppres-
sion. Since many of them claim a right of secession on that
basis, and some are willing to back that claim with force of
arms, there is an urgent need to clarify the law in this area.
For the reasons discussed above,'46 the goal of clarifying the
law is likely to be better served by an I.C.J. advisory opinion
than by a U.N. Declaration.
C. An Advisory Opinion on Tibet Might Help Facilitate
Political Dialogue Between Chinese and Tibetan Leaders
For the past two decades, there have been intermittent
efforts to initiate negotiations between the Dalai Lama and
the Chinese leadership concerning the future status of Ti-
bet. 7 In 1998, Chinese President Jiang Zemin said "that the
door to dialogue and negotiation is open as long as the Dalai
Lama publicly affirms that Tibet is an inalienable part of
China."'48 Since then, former President Clinton and Secretary
of State Madeline Albright "continued to urge the Chinese
leadership to enter into a substantive dialogue with the Dalai
Lama or his representatives."' 9 In the spirit of compromise,
the Dalai Lama has repeatedly expressed "his willingness to
accept Tibetan autonomy within China.""' Even so, "Beijing
144. See Kolodner, supra note 128, at 187-88.
145. See id. at 192-225.
146. See supra Part I.A.
147. See, e.g., VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 129, at 197-98 (describing
the political dialogue between Tibet and China during the period from 1979 to
1984); Vause, supra note 130, at 1588-89 (describing a five-point plan that the
Dalai Lama presented to the U.S. Congress in 1987).
148. Tibet: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of
Julia V. Taft, Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues), 2000 WL 19304805.
149. Id.
150. Tibet: Hearing Before the House International Relations Committee,
106th Cong. (2000) (statement of U.S. Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman), 2000 WL
19302286.
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refuses to negotiate with [the Dalai Lama] or his representa-
tives."15' There are some indications that the Chinese strat-
egy is simply to wait for the Dalai Lama to die, hoping that
"[wihen he dies, the issue of Tibet is resolved for ever." 2
The question arises whether an I.C.J. advisory opinion on
Tibet might induce China to begin serious negotiations with
the Dalai Lama about the future status of Tibet. Broadly
speaking, there are three possible outcomes of an I.C.J. advi-
sory opinion on Tibet: (1) the I.C.J. could affirm a Tibetan
right to independence; (2) the I.C.J. could reject Tibetan inde-
pendence; or (3) the I.C.J. could adopt a middle position, nei-
ther explicitly affirming nor rejecting a Tibetan right to inde-
pendence."' It is unlikely that any of the three possible
outcomes would actually harm the prospects for a dialogue
between China and the Tibetan government-in-exile, because
China does not currently show any signs of willingness to en-
gage in a dialogue."4
However, there is some chance that either of the first two
outcomes might break the current stalemate and spark seri-
ous negotiations between Chinese and Tibetan leaders. If the
I.C.J. ruled that Tibet does have a right to secede from China,
pressure would mount on the Chinese government to begin
direct negotiations with the Dalai Lama. In the alternative, a
clear I.C.J. ruling that Tibet does not have a right to secede
from China might also help promote negotiations between
China and the Dalai Lama, because such an I.C.J. decision
would help alleviate Chinese fears that negotiations over
"autonomy" would be the first step on a slippery slope to se-
cession. In contrast, a decision that neither affirmed nor re-
jected a Tibetan right of independence would be unlikely to
151. Id. See also U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES 2000 (Tibet addendum to China report), supra note 142
("Both central government and local officials often insist that dialog with the
Dalai Lama is essentially impossible.").
152. Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, Don't Shut Out the Dalai Lama, FAR EASTERN
ECONOMIC REVIEW (January 20, 2000) (quoting an unidentified "senior Chinese
official").
153. The nature and content of an I.C.J. ruling would depend, in part, on how
the request for an advisory opinion is formulated. If either ECOSOC or the
General Assembly decided to request an I.C.J. advisory opinion on Tibet, careful
consideration would be necessary to frame the question properly.
154. Sources report that the Dalai Lama sent his brother to Beijing in De-
cember 2000 in an effort to initiate a dialogue with the Chinese government.
See Regional Briefing, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW (December 14, 2000).
There are no signs of a Chinese response.
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spark a political dialogue between Chinese and Tibetan lead-
ers; such a decision would neither increase pressure on China
to address Tibetan grievances, nor allay China's fears about
Tibet's secessionist aspirations. Therefore, a "middle" out-
come would probably perpetuate the status quo.
Initiation of direct negotiations between China and the
Dalai Lama would be a significant positive step. The result of
such a dialogue is difficult to predict. Barring unforeseen cir-
cumstances, China will almost certainly not agree to Tibetan
independence. However, direct negotiations between China
and the Dalai Lama might lead to a political settlement that
would offer Tibet increased autonomy within a unified
China.'55 Regardless of the outcome, though, an I.C.J. advi-
sory opinion would be a success if it helped spark a political
dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama, thereby ending
the current stalemate.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no panacea that will lead to a prompt, negoti-
ated settlement of all the violent, or potentially violent, seces-
sionist disputes currently brewing around the world. How-
ever, the I.C.J. advisory opinion mechanism is an under-
utilized tool that may be helpful in promoting political set-
tlement of some secessionist disputes. Moreover, an I.C.J.
advisory opinion concerning a specific secessionist claim
would help clarify the legal relationship between the right of
peoples to self-determination and the right of states to pre-
serve their territorial integrity. Therefore, ECOSOC or the
General Assembly should identify an appropriate test case for
requesting an I.C.J. advisory opinion concerning a particular
secessionist claim.
155. U.S. government officials have indicated that they believe this may be a
workable solution. See Tibet: Hearing Before the House International Relations
Committee, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Julia V. Taft, Special Coordinator
for Tibetan Issues) ("The Dalai Lama has shown enormous courage in accepting
the impracticality of insisting on independence and calling for 'genuine auton-
omy' within Chinese sovereignty. Chinese spokesmen have responded by stat-
ing their willingness to engage in a dialogue with the Dalai Lama if he re-
nounces independence and pro-independence activities. The problem appears to
be solvable. Ultimately it comes down to a question of will, especially on Bei-
jing's side."), 2000 WL 19302288.
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